Abstract. Here, we observe that mean-field game (MFG) systems admit a twoplayer infinite-dimensional general-sum differential game formulation. We show that particular regimes of this game reduce to previously known variational principles. Furthermore, based on the game-perspective we derive new variational formulations for first-order MFG systems with congestion. Finally, we use these findings to prove the existence of time-periodic solutions for viscous MFG systems with a coupling that is not a non-decreasing function of density.
Introduction
In this note, we discuss the variational structure of mean-field game (MFG) systems and apply our findings to the construction of time-periodic solutions for systems with decreasing coupling.
MFG systems independently introduced by Lasry and Lions in [52, 53, 54] and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines [46, 47] is a framework to model populations that have a huge number of indistinguishable agents that play a differential game. In this framework, as in statistical physics, one models a huge population as a continuum of agents in some state space. Furthermore, the state of this population is modeled by the distribution of the agents in the state space. Hence, each agent in this game devises an optimal strategy based on the distribution of the population; that is, on the statistical rather than individual information about the positions of other agents. As a result, one obtains a system of PDE, a MFG system, that characterizes the optimal actions of the agents and the evolution of their distribution in the state space. MFG systems are analogs of macroscopic equations from statistical physics in the game-theoretic framework.
Currently, MFG theory is a very active research direction with numerous applications in economics [45, 3, 37] , finance [45, 17, 48] , industrial engineering [46, 47] , crowd dynamics [28] , knowledge growth [13, 14] and more. For further details on MFG theory we refer to [55, 15, 45, 12, 40, 39, 21, 22] and references therein. Here, we denote by T d the d-dimensional flat torus that is the state-space for a continuum of agents. Next, m(·, t), 0 t T, denotes the density of the distribution of the agents in the state-space at time t. In this model, each agent faces a stochastic optimal control problem with an independent Brownian motion of intensity ε 0, terminal time T , terminal cost function u T , and a Lagrangian that depends on the distribution m and gives rise to a Hamiltonian H :
The dependence of H on m is called the coupling of the MFG system. Furthermore, (x, t) → u(x, t) denotes the value function of this optimal control problem, and m 0 is the initial distribution density of the agents. We assume that m 0 > 0, and This previous system corresponds to a model where agents solve an ergodic (longtime average) optimal control problem. In (1.1) the unknowns are u, m and H. Latter, is the ergodic constant or the effective Hamiltonian and can be thought of as the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint T d m = 1.
We are interested in variational formulations of (1.1) and (1.2) ; that is, we aim at finding functionals of (m, u) that yield (1.1) and (1.2) as first-order optimality conditions.
The variational structure of MFG systems is not new. In a seminar paper on MFG, [54] , Lasry and Lions pointed out that if H has a form
for some H 0 : T d × R d → R, f : T d × R + → R then (1.1), (1.2) can be interpreted as optimality conditions for two dual optimal control problems of PDE -(5.2) and (5.4).
Latter are reminiscent of the dynamical formulation of the Optimal Transportation Problem by Benamou and Brenier [9] . These ideas were successfully used to analyze (1.1), (1.2) in various settings where there are no direct regularizing mechanisms from elliptic and parabolic PDE theory. In particular, first-order systems were addressed in [18, 44, 19, 43] , degenerate second-order systems were treated in [16] , and problems with constraints on m were considered in [56, 20] . Moreover, the optimal control formulations in [54] yield numerical solution methods for (1.1), (1.2) by optimization techniques as in [9] . We refer to [10, 11] and references therein for an account on these numerical methods. Additionally, similar ideas were used to treat mean-field type control problems with congestion in [4, 5] . Unfortunately, the optimal control formulation in [54] does not extend to systems where H is not of the form (1.3). As a result, there is no systematic approach to analyze (1.1), (1.2) when H is not of the form (1.3) and there is no regularization due to ellipticity. For instance, suppose that
for some H 0 :
and α > 0. In this case, (1.1), (1.2) correspond to so called soft congestion models. In these models, agents pay more for moving in denser areas. The congestion strength is modeled by α. Note that the no-congestion case, α = 0, corresponds to (1.3). As mentioned before, for H as in (1.4) there is no optimal control formulation of (1.1), (1.2) analogous to the one in [54] . Additionally, the singularity of H at m = 0 creates substantial difficulties when using purely PDE methods -see [41, 36, 42, 30, 1] for second-order systems. However, for a specific H it may still be possible to find a non-standard variational formulation for (1.1), (1.2). In [29] , for instance, authors found a new variational formulation for (1.2) when ε = 0 and 5) for some f : T d ×R ++ → R, Q ∈ R d , and 1 < α γ. The formulation in [29] yielded well-defined variational solutions that are unique and can be numerically calculated by optimization techniques. In [6, 32] , authors used yet another variational approach to MFG systems that is closely related to the uniqueness of solutions for (1.1), (1.2). In [55] , Lions derived a sufficient condition that guarantees uniqueness of smooth solutions for (1.1), (1.2). The condition reads as
In [6, 32] , Gomes and coauthors observed that under (1.6) the map
is a monotone operator. Therefore, (1.2) reduces to finding the zeros of a monotone operator. Furthermore, in [6, 32] authors defined weak solutions of (1.2) using variational inequalities and proved their existence using Minty's method from monotone operators theory. Moreover, Gomes and coauthors developed numerical solution methods for (1.2) and finite-state version of (1.1) in [6] and [34] , respectively, using monotone flows. For an overview of monotonicity methods for MFG systems we refer to [33] .
In this note, we aim at developing a systematic way to search for non-standard variational formulations for MFG systems. We formally show that solutions of (1.1) and (1.2) correspond to critical points of suitable functionals. Furthermore, we observe that under standard monotonicity assumptions these critical points correspond to Nash equilibria of two-player infinite-dimensional differential games (3.3), (3.10), (3.20) : Propositions 3.1, 3.2, 3.6.
Interestingly, when H is of the form (1.3) we obtain zero-sum games, Corollaries 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, that are directly linked to the optimal control formulations in [54] . More precisely, in Section 5 we observe that these zero-sum game formulations are the Hamiltonian forms of the optimal control problems in [54] .
For stationary first-order systems with H of the form (1.5) and parameter range 0 < α < 1 γ we again obtain a zero-sum game and thus find a saddle point formulation of (1.2) that is new in the literature: Corollaries 4.5, 4.6. Furthermore, in analogy with [9] , we find a convex optimization formulation of this saddle point problem that is also new: Remark 4.7. Moreover, as we observe in Section 5, this convex optimization formulation is a generalization of the transformation in [29] that was used to solve (1.2) for H of the form (1.5) and parameter range 0 < α < 1 γ in the two-dimensional case.
For stationary first-order systems with H of the form (1.5) and parameter range 1 < α, 1 γ we recover a potential game instead of a zero-sum game, Corollaries 4.8, 4.9 and Remark 4.10. Furthermore, when 1 < α γ the potential of this game is concave, and therefore Nash equilibria are the maximizers of this potential. Thus, in Section 5, we recover the variational principle in [29] .
Additionally, we discuss some interpretations of our results in terms of the meanfield type or McKean-Vlasov control theory: Remarks 3.3, 3.4, 3.5.
We would like to stress that our discussion on differential-game formulations for (1.1) and (1.2) are formal; that is, we perform our analysis at the level of smooth functions. Accordingly, we do not address the existence and regularity theory of suitable weak solutions. These are extremely interesting and apparently challenging problems.
In the final section of this work, we propose an application of the differentialgame formulation of (1.1) to systems where the uniqueness condition (1.6) is violated. We aim in particular at finding time-periodic solutions in the special case H(x, p, m) = |p| 2 /2 − f (m), where f is a decreasing function. Previously, a similar result with completely different techniques was obtained in [35] 
Recently, an increasing interest has been devoted to the study of models where multiplicity of equilibria arises [7, 23, 24, 26, 38, 35, 57] (also in the multi-population setting, see e.g. [2, 27, 51] ). In a previous work [25] , it has been proven the existence of solutions in simple models with separable Hamiltonians that exhibit an oscillatory behaviour on [0, T ]. Such results have been obtained by means of bifurcation methods, looking in particular at branches of non-trivial solutions as the time horizon T varies. The arise of periodic patterns led naturally to the question of existence of truly time-periodic solutions, namely a couple m, u defined for all t ∈ (−∞, +∞) and such that m(·, t + T ) = m(·, t) for some T > 0 and for all t. Here, we provide a positive answer to this question (see Theorem 6.1), under the assumption that −f ′ (1) is large enough.
The result again relies on bifurcation techniques, that in turn exploit an analysis of the linearized system similar to the one in [25] . A crucial point is that such techniques require that solutions to the linearized system consist of a vector space of dimension one (or odd); here, we overcome this issue using the variational structure of (1.1), that enables us to implement bifurcation for potential operators (namely Theorem 6.3). These are not restricted to odd dimension of eigenspaces. We finally observe that the equilibria that we find have non-trivial dependance in time (see Remark 1.1); this is remarkable in view of the autonomous nature of (1.1), where no periodic force acts explicitly.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation and hypotheses. Section 3 is devoted to the two-player infinite-dimensional game formulations (3.3), (3.10), (3.20) of (1.1) and (1.2) for a general Hamiltonian. Furthermore, in Section 4 we discuss particular Hamiltonians for which these games have more structure. Next, in Section 5 we discuss the connections among (3.3), (3.10), (3.20) and previously known variational principles. Finally, in Section 6 we prove the existence of time-periodic solutions for (1.1) when (1.6) is violated.
Notation and assumptions
We denote by T d , R d , R + , R ++ , respectively, the d-dimensional flat torus, the d-dimensional Euclidean space, the set of nonnegative real numbers and the set of positive real numbers. For T > 0 we denote by
For real positive and non-integer β, C β,β/2 (Ω T ) will be the standard Hölder parabolic space.
Throughout the note we assume that
Furthermore, for the differential-game formulation of (1.1) and (1.2) we need the following monotonicity assumption.
Note that (2.1) is necessary for (1.6). Furthermore, we define F H by
For arbitrary functional n → K(n) we denote by δK δn its variational derivative.
A two-player infinite-dimensional differential game
In this section, we show that under (2.1) the smooth solutions of (1.1) and (1.2) are Nash equilibria of a suitable two-player infinite-dimensional differential game. For (m, u) ∈ C 2 (Ω T ), m > 0 consider the following functionals:
and
Now, we consider the following differential game:
Player 1 sup
Player 2 inf
In (3.3), the first player chooses a strategy m ∈ C 2 (Ω T ), m > 0 and aims at maximizing Ψ 1 (m, u). The second player chooses a strategy u ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) and aims at minimizing Ψ 2 (m, u). Note that Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 are different in general, and hence (3.3) is a general-sum game.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that (2.1) holds. Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) such that m * > 0 one has that
if and only if (m * , u * ) is a classical solution of (1.1).
Proof. A straightforward calculation of the variational derivatives of Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 yields that (1.1) can be written as
Then, the proof follows from the fact that m → Ψ 1 (m, u), m > 0 is a concave functional, and u → Ψ 2 (m, u) is a convex functional when m > 0. Although elementary, we present the proof here for the sake of completeness. We start by the direct implication; that is, we assume that (m * , u * ), m * > 0 is a solution of (1.1), and we aim at proving (3.4), (3.5) . Pick an arbitrary test function m ∈ C 2 (Ω T ), m > 0 and consider
where φ = m − m * . Note that I 1 is well defined in some neighborhood of h = 0 that contains h = 1 because m, m * > 0. Then, we have that
Therefore, we have that
because (m * , u * ) is a solution of (1.1). Furthermore, we have that
by (2.1). Hence, h → I 1 (h) is a concave function, and its critical points are points of maxima. Therefore, I 1 (1) I 1 (0) which is exactly (3.4). Next, we prove (3.5). For arbitrary u ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) consider
where ψ = u − u * . Then, we have that
Hence, we obtain that
by (2.1). Hence, h → I 2 (h) is a convex function, and its critical points are minima. Thus, I 2 (1) I 2 (0) which yields (3.5). Now, we turn to the inverse implication. Pick an arbitrary test function φ ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) and consider I 1 given by (3.6). Then, h → I 1 (h) is defined in the neighborhood of h = 0 because m * > 0. Since, (m * , u * ) satisfies (3.4) we have that
Hence, we have that I ′ 1 (0) = 0. From the previous calculations we have that
Since φ is arbitrary we obtain
Furthermore, let ψ ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) and consider I 2 given by (3.7). Then, we have that I 2 (h) I 2 (0), h ∈ R by (3.5). Consequently, we obtain that I ′ 2 (0) = 0. But we have that
Since ψ is arbitrary, we obtain that
and the proof is complete.
For the ergodic version of (3.3) we introduce the payoff functionalŝ
for m, u ∈ C 2 (T d ), m > 0. Then, we consider the following game:
if and only if (m * , u * ) is a classical solution of (1.2) for some H * ∈ R.
Moreover, for both cases above one has that
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 3.1.
Remark 3.3. As we pointed out in the Introduction, (1.1) and (1.2) are Nash equilibrium conditions in a differential game with infinitely many agents that interact through the distribution of the whole population, the mean-field. Interestingly, Ψ 2 andΨ 2 can be interpreted in terms of the average payoff of the population. More precisely, for a given control r :
, and the dynamics is given by
The mean-field type or McKean-Vlasov optimal control problem reduces to
Here, S(r) is interpreted as average payoff or the social cost of the population when control r is applied. Thus, (3.12) is an optimal control problem for a central planner that aims at minimizing the average cost per agent. We refer to [21] for a detailed discussion on McKean-Vlasov optimal control problems and their relation to MFG systems.
Then, t → m(·, t) evolves according to (3.11) , where the control r is given by
Thus, using the identity
we obtain that
Now, suppose that (m * , u * ) ∈ C 2 (Ω T ), m * > 0 is a Nash equilibrium of (3.3). Then, by Proposition 3.1 (m * , u * ) is a classical solution of (1.1), and hence (3.13) is valid for (m, u) = (m * , u * ). Therefore, from (3.15) one has that the social cost corresponding to the MFG equilibrium is equal to −Ψ 2 (m * , u * ); that is, the negative of the Player 2 value in (3.3). Similarly, from Proposition 3.2 we have that if (m * , u * ) ∈ C 2 (T d ), m * > 0 is a Nash equilibrium in (3.10), then (m * , u * , H * ) is a classical solution of (1.2) for some H * ∈ R, and −Ψ 2 (m * , u * ) is the ergodic social cost. But we have that
2) can be interpreted as an ergodic social cost.
Remark 3.4. The PDE system corresponding to the optimality conditions of (3.12) is given by
is a solution of this system. Then rm ,û given by (3.14) is a solution of (3.12) [12, 21] . Thus, if (m * , u * ) ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) is a solution of (1.1), and r m * ,u * is the corresponding control given by (3.14), then
Furthermore, using (3.15) we get that
Interestingly, (3.17) can be obtained in a simple and direct manner without going through McKean-Vlasov or PDE optimal control approach. Indeed, one can check that smooth solutions of (3.16) are the critical points of the functional Ψ 2 . Hence, similar to Proposition 3.1, if p → H(x, p, m) is convex and m → mH(x, p, m) is concave, then smooth solutions of (3.16) are Nash equilibria of a two-player zerosum game Player 1 sup
Now, suppose that (m * , u * ) and (m,û) are Nash equilibria for (3.3) and (3.18) respectively. Then,û is a suboptimal strategy for Player 2 in (3.3) so
Furthermore, m * is a suboptimal strategy for Player 1 in (3.18) so
and we arrive at (3.17).
Remark 3.5. In contrast with (1.1) and (1.2), system (3.16) always admits a variational formulation [4] . One way to explain this phenomenon is that (1.1) and (1.2) correspond to Nash equilibria of a nonzero-sum game and (3.16) corresponds to a zero-sum game. Moreover, when H is separable (1.3) we observe in Corollaries 4.1, 4.2 that games (3.3), (3.10) are equivalent to zero-sum games (4.6), (4.8). Thus, it is expected that (1.1) and (1.2) admit variational formulations for separable H. This is indeed the case as observed in [54] .
In Proposition 3.2, the first player faces an optimization problem with constraint 19) for m, u ∈ C 2 (T d ), m > 0, H ∈ R and consider the game Player 1 sup
Then, we have the following proposition.
if and only if (m * , u * , H * ) is a classical solution of (1.2).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 3.1. The key point is that the m →Ψ 1 (m, u * , H * ) is a concave functional, and (u, H) →Ψ 2 (m * , u, H) is a convex functional.
Various regimes of the game
In this section, we consider several types of H for which (3.3) and (3.10) can be simplified. In particular, we consider separable and power-like Hamiltonians with congestion.
4.1.
In this case, (1.1) and (1.2) respectively become
The assumption (2.1) in this case is equivalent to the following one.
where
(4.5) Proposition 3.1 asserts that an optimal u * is a minimizer of u → Ψ 2 (m *
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that (4.3) holds. Furthermore, let Ψ 1 be given by (4.4). Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (Ω T ) such that m * > 0 one has that
if and only if (m * , u * ) is a classical solution of (4.1).
This previous corollary asserts that for H as in (1.3) the smooth solutions of (1.1) are Nash equilibria of the infinite-dimensional zero-sum game Player 1 sup
Furthermore, for H of the form (1.3) we have thatΨ 1 ,Ψ 1 from (3.8) and (3.19) take the form Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (T d ) such that m * > 0 one has that
if and only if (m * , u * ) is a classical solution of (4.2) for some H * ∈ R.
where F * (x, w) = sup
is the convex conjugate of F .
The differential game corresponding to this previous corollary is Player 1 sup Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (T d ), H * ∈ R such that m * > 0 one has that
if and only if (m * , u * , H * ) is a classical solution of (4.2).
The corresponding differential game is Player 1 sup
(4.9)
Remark 4.4. Note that the special structure of (1.1) when H is separable stems from the Hamiltonian nature of the system. Indeed, (1.1) has the form 
that indeed coincides with Ψ 1 once it is equipped with initial-final data m 0 , u T (see (4.4) ). We will come back to the Hamiltonian nature of (1.1) in Section 5 where we discuss connections among (4.6) and optimal-control formulations of (1.1) from [54] .
4.2.
First-order stationary problems with congestion and a power-like Hamiltonian. In this section, we consider the first-order (ε = 0) version of (1.2) with a Hamiltonian (1.5), where (Q, α, γ) ∈ R d+1 × R ++ are given parameters, and f ∈ C 1 (T d × R ++ ). More precisely, we consider the system 
Next, we have that
where F (x, m) = m f (x, z)dz. Therefore,Ψ 1 ,Ψ 2 in (3.8), (3.9) are given bŷ
Furthermore, we observe that
Hence, for α < 1 minimizations in u ofΨ 1 andΨ 2 are equivalent, and Proposition 3.2 is valid withΨ 2 replaces byΨ 1 .
Corollary 4.5. Suppose that (4.11) holds and α < 1. Furthermore, letΨ 1 be given by (4.12). Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (T d ) such that m * > 0 and T d m * = 1 one has thatΨ
if and only if (m * , u * ) is a classical solution of (4.10) for some H * ∈ R.
Furthermore,Ψ 1 ,Ψ 2 in (3.19) are given bỹ
for m, u ∈ C 2 (T d ), m > 0. Similarly, for α < 1 minimizations in u ofΨ 1 andΨ 2 are equivalent, and an analog of Proposition 3.6 is valid.
Corollary 4.6. Suppose that (4.11) holds and α < 1. Furthermore, letΨ 1 be given by (4.15). Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (T d ), H * ∈ R such that m * > 0 one has that
if and only if (m * , u * , H * ) is a classical solution of (4.10).
To the best of our knowledge, zero-sum game formulations of (4.10) for the parameters range 0 α < 1 < γ in Corollaries 4.5, 4.6 are new in the literature.
Remark 4.7. Using the zero-sum game formulation of (4.10) in Corollary 4.5 one can formally derive a convex optimization formulation of (4.10) in the spirit of [9] . Indeed, one has that Furthermore, we have that For α > 1 we observe from (4.13) that the minimization of u →Ψ 2 (m, u) corresponds to the maximization of u →Ψ 1 (m, u). Therefore, we have the following versions of Corollaries 4.5, 4.6. 
Moreover, for both cases above, (4.14) holds.
Corollary 4.9. Suppose that (4.11) holds and α > 1. Furthermore, letΨ 1 be given by (4.15). Then, for any m * , u * ∈ C 2 (T d ), H * ∈ R such that m * > 0 one has that
Remark 4.10. Corollaries 4.8, 4.9 assert that (1.2) corresponds to Nash equilibria of Player 1 sup 19) and Player 1 sup
Unlike (4.8) and (4.9) that are zero-sum games (4.19) and (4.20) are potential games with potentialsΨ 1 andΨ 1 , respectively.
Previously known variational principles
In this section, we discuss how infinite-dimensional differential game formulations in Propositions 3.1, 3.2, 3.6 are related to the variational principles in the MFG literature.
5.1. Infinite-dimensional optimal control formulation. Throughout this section we assume that H is given by (1.3) , where
and (4.3) holds. As before, F (x, m) = m f (x, z)dz, m > 0, and
Furthermore, denote by
, and q → L 0 (x, q) is strictly convex and coercive uniformly in x. Moreover,
with an equality if and only if
In [54] , Lasry and Lions observed that (1.1) is equivalent to two infinite-dimensional optimal control problems. For the first problem, consider the cost functional
where r : Ω T → R d is the control, m is the state, and the dynamics is according to a Fokker-Planck equation
Thus, the first optimal control problem is
For the second problem consider the functional
where s : Ω T → R is the control, u is the state, and the dynamics is given by
Hence, the second optimal control problem is
In [54] , the authors observe that (5.2), (5.4) are dual optimization problems (in the sense of Fenchel-Rockafellar) that yield (1.1) as optimality conditions. Additionally, under convexity assumptions for p → H 0 (x, p) and m → F (x, m) the cost functionals s → A(s) and r → B(r) are convex. Here, we observe that the differential-game formulation (4.6) is the Hamiltonian viewpoint for the optimal control problems (5.2) and (5.4). For that, we briefly recall the Hamiltonian formalism for finite-dimensional optimal control problems and apply it to (5.2), (5.4) to arrive at (4.6).
Consider a finite-dimensional optimal control problem
In (5.5) γ is the state variable and c is the control. To obtain the Hamiltonian formulation of (5.5) one introduces an adjoint variable, p, and transforms (5.5) into an equivalent problem
Next, we proceed by formally interchanging the inf sup order and eliminating the control (Pontryagin maximum principle):
Therefore, (5.5) is formally equivalent to the problem
If we calculate the variational derivatives of (5.6) with respect to p and γ we arrive at the system
This previous system is the Hamiltonian formulation of (5.5). Now, let us formally apply the procedure above to (5.2) and (5.4).
where Ψ 1 is given by (4.4). Therefore, we arrive at (4.6) where Player 1 makes the first move. For (5.4) one has that
where Ψ 1 is again given by (4.4). Thus, we obtain (4.6) where Player 2 makes the first move.
In [18] and subsequent papers [44, 19, 43, 16, 56, 20 ] the authors considered a modification of (5.2) in the spirit of [9] . More precisely, they chose as a control w = mr instead of r and considered the optimization problem
The advantage of (5.7) over (5.2) is that the former is a convex optimization problem in (m, w) with a linear constraint whereas (5.2) is not jointly convex in (m, r) and (5.1) is not a jointly linear constraint in (m, r).
5.2.
First-order stationary MFG with congestion. In [29] , the authors observed that under assumptions (4.11) and 1 < α γ (4.10) admits a variational formulation
where Additionally the authors observed in [29] that (m, u) → J(m, u), m > 0 is not convex when 0 < α < 1 < γ, and hence (5.8) is not valid. Accordingly, they applied a suitable transformation to (m, u) and obtained a new pair (m, v) that solves a related system of the form (4.10) with parameters 1 <α <γ. Consequently, they obtained a convex optimization problem similar to (5.8) for (m, v) that allowed to find (m, u) by first finding (m, v) and then applying an inverse transformation.
Unfortunately, the technique in [29] is valid only in the two-dimensional setting because of the special structure of divergence free vector fields in two-dimensions.
Here, we observe that variational formulation (4.18) is the generalization of the one in [29] to the higher-dimensional setting. Indeed, if d = 2, then (4.17) yields that
for some v : T 2 → R and R ∈ R 2 , and ⊥ is the rotation by π/2. Therefore, we have that
This previous formulation is precisely the one obtained in [29] for (m, v). Finally, note that (5.9) is almost identical to (5.8).
Existence of non-trivial periodic solutions to variational MFG
In this section, we present some results on the existence of periodic in time solutions that are based on the aforementioned variational structure. We will assume that H(x, p, m) = 1 2 |p| 2 − f (m), where f is a smooth decreasing function. For simplicity, ε = 1.
We look for a solution to (1.1) such that m(·, t) is defined for all t ∈ (−∞, +∞) and m(·, t + T ) = m(·, t) for some T > 0 and for all t. Periodicity in time of u is more subtle and cannot be expected in general: for Hamilton-Jacobi equations with periodic data one usually looks for quasi-periodic solutions; that is, solutions φ such that φ(·, t + T ) = φ(·, t) + HT, ∀t for some H ∈ R and period T (see, e. g., [8, 31] ). For such φ, the function u(·, t) = φ(·, t) − Ht is T -periodic. Therefore, we search for a triple (u, H, m), where u, m are T -periodic in the t variable and solve
Note, that for smooth solution of this system the t → T d m(x, t)dx is a conserved quantity. Therefore, for smooth solutions this previous system is equivalent to
Our first observation is that concerning periodic solutions (6.1) can be cast as a stationary (ergodic) MFG system rather than a time-dependent one. The only difference with (1.2) is that the suitable Hamiltonian is linear in the gradient variable u t and the Laplacian is degenerate in the t direction. Indeed, consider the Hamiltoniañ
and a degenerate diffusion Au(x, t) = ∆ x u(x, t).
Then, (6.1) can be written as
Furthermore, as we observed before, this previous system can be fitted into a variational framework. Indeed, (6.2) has precisely the same analytic structure as (1.2).
Therefore, from Corollary 4.3 we have that (6.2) can be cast as 4) and F (m) = m f (z)dz. The fact that (6.1) can be written as (6.3) is crucial in our analysis. To take advantage of bifurcation methods, we perform a change of variables as follows:
Then, U and M are functions over Q = T d+1 and solve
We require Q U dxdt = 0 since U in the Hamilton-Jacobi equation is defined up to an addition of constants. Note that T itself should be regarded as an unknown of the problem. As (6.2), the system (6.5) can also be cast as an equation for critical points of a suitable functional, g, that we obtain below by expressingΨ 1 in (6.4) in (U, M, H ) variables. First, (6.5) can be restated in terms of the zero-locus of a suitable functional G. Let α ∈ (0, 1), X be the Banach space
that is, G has a trivial solution for all T > 0. The change of variables is indeed designed for the trivial solution to be identically zero, to apply bifurcation theory.
In the rest of this section, we will aim at proving the following Theorem 6.1. Suppose that −8π 2 < f ′ (1) < −4π 2 and let
Then, (0, 0, 0, T ) is a bifurcation point for the equation G(U, M, H , T ) = 0. In other words, there exists a sequence of non-trivial solutions
Going back to the original unknowns, Theorem 6.1 states that there exists a sequence of non-trivial solutions (u n , H n , m n ) to (6.1) that is T n -periodic, that is, couples (u n , m n ) solving (1.1) such that m n is T n -periodic.
Let us start by some comments on the functional setting. Since C 4+α,2+α/2 (Q) ⊂ L 2 (Q), we can consider a scalar product on X defined by (
Passing from (u, m, H) variables to (U, M, H) in (6.4) we obtain a functional g : X × R → R given by
It is quite standard to prove that g is differentiable (when T > 0). Then, G is a potential operator in the following sense:
the equality following by integration by parts.
A crucial role will be played by the properties of the linearized problem DG = 0. We compute the Fréchet derivative of G,
Evaluating it at the trivial solution (0, 0, 0) gives the linear operator A(T )
Lemma 6.2. Zero is an (isolated) eigenvalue of A(T ) with multiplicity 4d. Moreover, A(T ) is a Fredholm operator of index zero 1 .
To prove Lemma 6.2, we perform an analysis on the Fourier coefficients of v, µ: let us denote by (λ k ) k≥0 the non-decreasing sequence of eigenvalues of −∆ (on T N ), with corresponding eigenvectors ψ k ∈ C ∞ (T N ); let (ψ k ) k≥0 be renormalized such that it constitutes an orthonormal basis of L 2 (T N ). Note that the first eigenvalue λ 0 is zero, with associated constant eigenfunction ψ 0 ≡ 1. Non-zero eigenvalues can be expressed in the form
We may represent v, µ as follows:
where v k , µ k is a family of (time) periodic functions of class C 2+α/2 (T). In general, we will refer to the Fourier coefficients by using the subscript k, i.e. f k (·) :
1 That is, A(T ) has kernel and cokernel of same finite dimension. 
T µ 0 (t)dt = 0. By periodicity, we obtain µ 0 ≡ 0. Furthermore, ℓ = 0, and v 0 ≡ 0 since T v 0 (t)dt = Q v(x, t)dxdt = 0. On the other hand, for all k ≥ 1 we have
By the standing assumptions, for all k > 2d we have
when k = 1, . . . , 2d, solutions (µ k , v k ) to (6.6) consist of a two-dimensional vector space spanned by
Therefore, we have that A(T ) has a non-trivial kernel of dimension 4d. To prove that cokernel A(T ) has the same dimension, we proceed analogously. For any given triple (ω, ν, a) (note that ω can be assumed such that Q ω = 0), the equation A(T )[v, µ, ℓ] = (ω, ν, a) reads as follows. For k = 0,
The first equation determines µ 0 , while the other two ones determine first ℓ by integration on T and then v 0 , recalling that T v 0 = 0. For all k > 2d, 
To prove Theorem 6.1, we need to define the crossing number of A(T ) through 0 at T = T . First, for any T > 0, denote by σ < (T ) the sum of the multiplicities of all perturbed eigenvalues of A(T ) near 0 on the negative real axis. For some δ > 0, σ < (T ) is constant for all T ∈ (T − δ, T ) and for all T ∈ (T , T + δ). The crossing number is then defined by
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We will apply the following result that can be found in [49] or [50, Theorem II.7.3] . Therefore, if σ is small we get that ℓ = 0. Thus, we arrive at
T µ 0 (t)dt = 0. But then, we get that µ ′′ 0 + σ(σ + T f ′ (1))µ 0 = 0, T µ 0 = 0. Therefore, if µ 0 = 0 we get that σ(σ + T f ′ (1)) = 4π 2 n 2 for some n 1 which is impossible when σ is small. Hence, for σ small enough we have that µ 0 ≡ 0. Latter, in turn, yields v 0 ≡ 0.
For all k ≥ 1
As before, we have that µ k ≡ 0 for all k 2d+1 for σ small enough, since T 2 λ k (λ k + f ′ (1)) is positive and bounded away from zero for all T in a neighbourhood of T . Therefore, we need to consider the equation for 1 k 2d. Note that λ k = λ 1 . Let
We have h(T , 0) = 0 and ∂ σ h(T , 0) = T (λ 1 − f ′ (1)) > 0, so by the Implicit Function Theorem, there exists a C 1 function σ(·) defined in a neighborhood of T such that h(T, σ(T )) = 0. One can also verify that σ ′ (T ) > 0. Indeed, we have that
Whenever h(T, σ(T )) = 0, (6.7) has non-trivial solutions of the form µ k (t) = A cos(2πt) + B sin(2πt), A, B ∈ R.
In other words, σ(T ) is (the only) eigenvalue in a neighbourhood of zero of A(T ), with multiplicity 2 · 2d = 4d. The eigenfunctions are (we just write the µ entry for brevity)
{cos(2πt) cos(2πx i ), cos(2πt) sin(2πx i ), sin(2πt) cos(2πx i ), sin(2πt) sin(2πx i )} N i=1 .
Since σ(T ) < 0 for T < T and σ(T ) > 0 for T > T (in a neighbourhood of T ), we have a non-zero crossing number, in particular χ(A(T ), T ) = 4d. Hence Theorem 6.3 applies.
Remark 6.4. Very little can be said about qualitative properties of U n , M n , but we can rule out the chance that they do not depend on time and that are just functions of the x-variable. In other words, our bifurcation result does not select non-trivial solutions that are stationary. We have to go through the proof of Theorem 6.3, that is based on the well-known Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction (see, e.g., [50] ). Denote by U = (U, M, H) ∈ X and by P : X → ker(A(T )) the L 2 -orthogonal projection. Then, On the other hand, the finite dimensional bifurcation equation P G(V + ψ(V, T ), T ) = 0, V ∈ ker(A(T )) (6.8)
is solved by means of Conley's index theory applied to the dynamical systemV = P G(V + ψ(V, T ), T ). Bifurcation is actually proven for the finite-dimensional problem, namely, there exists a sequence of non-trivial solutions (V n , T ) → (0, T ) to (6.8) . Recall that ker(A(T )) is spanned by functions of the form sin(2πt)ψ k (x) and cos(2πt)ψ k (x) in the µ entry (see Lemma 6.2) . Therefore, M n in U n = (U n , M n , H n ) cannot be constant in the t-variable, otherwise P U n = V n would be zero, contradicting the property that V n is non-trivial. Note that by the properties of ψ we get the expansion Let us analyze the sequence m n , and recall that m n (x, t) = 1 + M n (x, t/T n ). By the previous remark, one should get that M n (x, t/T n ) is approximately an element of ker(A(T )), so it is a linear combination of sin(2πt/T n )ψ k (x) and cos(2πt/T n )ψ k (x), with 1/T n → 1/T . On the other hand, m N n (x, t) = 1 + M N n (x, t/T N n ), where M N n (x, t/T N n ) is approximately an element of ker(A(T N )). Such kernel is spanned by sin(2πN t)ψ k (x) and cos(2πN t)ψ k (x), therefore, M N n (x, t/T N n ) is approximately a linear combination of sin(2πN t/T N n )ψ k (x) and cos(2πN t/T N n )ψ k (x), and N/T N n → 1/T independently on N .
